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ABSTRACT 
An understanding of the financial and distributional consequences of Social Security reform 
requires knowledge about the actual life circumstances of participants, including the level and 
pattern of their lifetime earnings and when they retire.  Some analyses of Social Security reform 
make simplifying assumptions about these characteristics by using “hypothetical workers” with 
set career paths.  We seek to develop greater understanding about actual lifetime earnings 
patterns to compare with hypothetical workers and find discrepancies which lead typical 
hypothetical workers to produce a more favorable impression for defined-contribution pension 
reforms.  We suggest modifications to make a more suitable hypothetical worker. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 An understanding of the financial and distributional consequences of Social Security 
reform requires knowledge about the actual life circumstances of those participating in the Social 
Security system.  This is especially the case with defined-contribution pensions, in which both 
the level and pattern of lifetime earnings, including when work begins, how many working-age 
years are spent outside of the labor force, and when work ends, will play instrumental roles in 
determining benefit amounts.  In particular, with a defined-contribution pension, earnings that 
come early in one’s career will have more time to experience compounding growth.  At the same 
time, the pattern and timing of earnings does not play much role in the formulas used by the 
United States Social Security Administration (SSA) to calculate the Average Indexed Monthly 
Earnings (AIME) and the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA), which provide the basis for 
calculating a worker’s Social Security benefit.   
 Because obtaining the lifetime earnings data of actual workers for research purposes has 
been challenging until recently, past researchers often relied on “hypothetical workers” with 
simplified characteristics for use in studying reform.  Hypothetical workers are generally noted 
for having steady earnings across lengthy careers of forty years or more.  They tend to vary only 
on the basis of earnings levels, gender, marital status, and birth cohort.  Gender differences are 
noted mainly for different mortality rates, not for different earnings levels.   
While hypothetical workers can be suitable for studying some aspects of Social Security, 
such as calculations of “money’s worth” measures, they may fare less well in other regards.  We 
identify defined-contribution pensions as an area in which hypothetical workers may 
dramatically overestimate the potential portfolio accumulations, and this paper seeks to examine 
the issue more closely.  While other sources of data are increasingly becoming available for the 
United States so that using hypothetical workers is no longer necessary, this study still provides 
an important message for countries that must rely on hypothetical workers for lack of adequate 
alternatives, such as the recent 53 country study by the World Bank in Whitehouse (2007).  Our 
research suggests how hypothetical workers can be modified to provide better results. 
We use the Benefits and Earnings Public-Use Files from 2004, a publicly available 
dataset from the SSA that includes data on the lifetime Social Security covered earnings histories 
of Social Security beneficiaries in December 2004.  This data specifically covers the complete 
careers of workers through their retirement without a need to extrapolate earnings or retirement 
age using information about a portion of a working career.  We focus on whether there are 
systemic differences produced by the use of hypothetical workers when considering defined-
contribution pension accounts which can create misleading results.  We find that the incomes of 
actual workers and the lengths of their work careers are typically lower than those of their 
stylized counterparts, especially for the case of women.  Hypothetical workers also tend to earn 
more in the early parts of their careers than actual workers, which inflates their potential asset 
accumulations at retirement.  Also, half of retirement beneficiaries began their benefit receipt at 
the earliest possible age of 62, and half of retirement beneficiaries worked less than 35 years 
before retiring.  Regarding the distributional consequences, workers with lower lifetime incomes 
tend to experience shorter working careers and greater variability in the patterns of their lifetime 
earnings.   
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Consequently, reforms which create defined-contribution individual accounts will tend to 
show larger portfolio accumulations for hypothetical workers than are possible for actual 
workers.  For example, compared to a hypothetical worker with a lifetime income adjusted to 
match each actual worker, but with a steady pattern of earnings from age 21 through retirement 
at 65, the median actual worker from the lowest income decile could only accumulate 65.5 
percent as much, and there are very few cases in which actual workers can do as well as the 
hypothetical worker.  Our findings do suggest some hope for hypothetical worker studies though: 
if hypothetical workers are adjusted to have a scaled-earnings pattern that better matches the 
actual age-wage profile, and if hypothetical workers are assumed to retire at the early retirement 
age of 62, then their asset accumulations will much more closely match those of actual workers.  
Essentially, hypothetical workers have careers spanning too many years and have too much 
earnings in the early parts of their careers.  The goal of this paper is to quantify some of these 
features in comparing the work histories of actual workers to their hypothetical worker 
counterparts. 
BACKGROUND 
 Using hypothetical workers to analyze “money’s worth” and redistribution issues in 
Social Security has a lengthy tradition.  In considering some of the more recent incarnations for 
the United States, Nichols, Clingman, and Glanz (2001) use hypothetical worker models to 
assess whether different types of workers are able to obtain their “money’s worth” from their 
contributions to Social Security in terms of rates of return or net lifetime transfers.  Their 
methodology is updated in Clingman and Nichols (2007).  Steuerle and Bakija (1994) use 
hypothetical workers to examine the redistribution of income caused by Social Security both 
within and across generations.  Goss and Wade (2002) use scaled-earnings hypothetical workers 
who start work at age 21 and retire at age 65 to assess the impact on total portfolio accumulations 
and benefits of reform proposals that would create defined-contribution individual accounts.  
Pfau (2003) considers the impact of various Social Security reform proposals based on how they 
affect hypothetical workers in a stochastic setting.  Additionally, while studies about the United 
States have been shifting toward the use of alternative sources of data on lifetime earnings, the 
hypothetical worker approach is still used for other countries where alternative data sources are 
less available.  For example, Whitehouse (2007) uses hypothetical workers to compare the 
defined-benefit and defined-contribution pension systems of 53 countries.  These are some of the 
more recent studies, though Leimer (1999) provides more details about previous incarnations, 
and Leimer (1995) includes a lengthy bibliography of previous hypothetical worker studies.   
 Typically, hypothetical workers vary by birth year, gender, level of annual earnings, 
marital status, and number of children.  The breakdown may include four different family types 
for each of four income levels.  Though there is some variation among these details, the family 
types often include single males, single females, married couples in which the male is the only 
wage earner, and married couples in which each spouse earns wages.  Married couples may be 
assumed to be the same age as one another and to have children at ages 25 and 30.  Thus far, the 
assumptions are relatively innocuous.  Though they are unlikely to describe the exact situation of 
any particular worker, these assumptions provide a realistic framework for comparison. 
 However, there are other aspects of hypothetical workers that are potentially more 
troubling.  Of particular concern is the unrealistic nature of the earnings histories.  The 
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traditional pattern is to assign a worker to an earnings level that is some fixed percentage of the 
economy-wide average earnings level, known as the Average Wage Index (AWI), and then 
assume that workers earn the same steady proportion of the AWI for their entire career.  Because 
the AWI has historically grown faster than consumer prices, this pattern assumes real wage 
growth over one’s career in the neighborhood of one percent per year.  Earnings are either low, 
average, high, or at the maximum taxable level allowed under the Social Security payroll tax.  
Low wage workers earn 45% of the AWI for each year they work (consistently low wages across 
a long career), while average wage workers earn the AWI, high wage workers earn 160% of the 
AWI (up to the maximum taxable wage, which was lower than this in the 1950s and 1960s), and 
maximum wage workers earn the maximum taxable wage for each year.  No distinctions are 
made by gender with regard to wages.  Hypothetical workers typically begin work on their 21
st
 
or 22
nd
 birthday and retire on their 62
nd
 (early retirement age) or 65
th
 (full retirement age for 
those born before 1938) birthday.  It is not common to build in periods of unemployment (except 
for some studies that incorporate disability) for hypothetical workers, and so a constant work 
history is assumed.  One ameliorative feature of the Nichols et al. (2001) study was its creation 
of a scaled-earnings history to be compared to the traditional steady-earnings history, in which 
wages follow the well-demonstrated age pattern of starting low at the beginning of one’s career, 
rising steadily into one’s 50s, and then slowly descending until retirement.  But this approach 
also does not allow for periods of unemployment. 
 Practitioners of hypothetical worker studies are well aware of their limitations, which are 
outlined well in Leimer (1995).  He argues that actual workers differ by ages of labor force entry, 
labor force participation and unemployment patterns, lifetime earnings patterns, ages of 
retirement, and survival probabilities, all of which affect the answers to research questions but do 
not get properly considered in hypothetical worker analyses.  These matters may be quite 
important when considering potential Social Security reforms.  Hypothetical worker studies may 
introduce biases when the impact of reform depends on the level and pattern of lifetime earnings, 
as is particularly the case with a defined-contribution pension system.  Nonetheless, because of 
difficulties in obtaining data on the lifetime earnings of workers, researchers have traditionally 
appealed to the hypothetical worker approach for the lack of better alternatives.   
 That being said, the past ten years have been witness to an emerging literature which 
takes care to account for the heterogeneity found in realistic lifetime earnings histories for the 
United States.  Table 1 provides an overview of some of the datasets used for these analyses.  
The first entry in the table is the SSA Benefits and Earnings Public-Use File, which is more 
commonly known as the Social Security Earnings Records (SSER).  Various versions of this data 
provide an annual earnings breakdown for Social Security participants since 1951.  The data is 
for Social Security covered earnings, which consists of earnings up to the taxable maximum for 
workers in jobs covered by Social Security.  By linking another dataset to the SSER, researchers 
have been able to obtain long portions of career earnings for many individuals, for whom they 
can identify various socioeconomic characteristics.  Many studies, though, require researchers to 
make artificial extrapolations for missing years of earnings and/or for the worker’s retirement 
age.  Lifetime earnings histories are only available once people who began their careers after 
1950 have retired.  But forcing projected earnings to follow an econometric equation may reduce 
much of the heterogeneity of actual earnings histories and not necessarily be more informative 
than a hypothetical worker approach.     
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  // Table 1 About Here // 
 Table 1 also describes some of the key microdatasets which have been linked with the 
SSER data.  These data links are made using Social Security Numbers and are highly restricted 
for the purposes of confidentiality.  An early dataset of this nature is the 1973 Current Population 
Survey CPS-IRS-SSA Exact Match study, repeated again in 1978.  But by 1978, there were only 
27 possible years of earnings (1951 to 1977), not yet enough for a full career.  More recent 
incarnations of this approach have matched the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP) or the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) to the SSER.  For example, by linking the 
1990-1993 SIPP surveys with Social Security data, Bosworth, Burtless, and Steuerle (1999) 
investigate the lifetime pattern of earnings, dividing workers into nine groups based on the level 
(low, average, or high) and shape (rising, level, or declining over time) of lifetime earnings.  
They find that the pattern assumed by hypothetical workers studies is not typical, and that only 
3.4 percent of men and 5.4 percent of women can be classified as middle income workers with 
level lifetime earnings.  Likewise, Au, Mitchell, and Phillips (2004) use the HRS matched to 
SSA earnings data to assess how well hypothetical workers reflect the earnings histories of actual 
workers.  They find that the earnings of hypothetical workers are larger than actual workers, and 
that actual workers had more in common with low wage hypothetical workers than with average 
wage hypothetical workers.  In another study, Haider and Solon (2006) use the 1951-1991 Social 
Security earnings histories linked to the HRS to demonstrate the dangers of using current 
earnings to proxy for lifetime earnings and to develop a deeper relationship between annual and 
lifetime earnings. 
 Another popular option has been to use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), 
which provides an ongoing panel of 8,000 families since 1968.  It can now provide an earnings 
record for a large part of a worker’s career.  Though it does not cover as long a timeframe, its 
advantages include its coverage of all earnings (not just Social Security covered earnings) and its 
linking of spouses.  For instance, Coronado, Fullerton, and Glass (1999) use the PSID to 
extrapolate lifetime earnings for a sample of individuals with 22 years of earnings observations 
(1968-1989) in order to more carefully examine Social Security’s redistributive impacts across 
the lifetime income distribution.  Also, Hungerford (2003) took steps to better understand the 
situation of workers with low lifetime earnings: do they tend to have high annual earnings during 
a short career, or consistent low annual earnings across a long career?  He combines the 1978 
Exact Match study with the PSID using statistical matching techniques in order to obtain 
artificial entire career records.  He finds that most workers with low lifetime earnings are 
women, and the reason for the low lifetime earnings is because of fewer years worked. 
 Another approach of essential importance to current policy studies in the United States is 
the Social Security Administration’s project, Modeling Income in the Near Term (MINT).  This 
study matches SIPP data to the Social Security earnings records for individuals born between 
1931 and 1960.  The goal is to project the future income distribution for these birth cohorts.  It 
also develops 13 stylized earnings patterns, including the nine described above from Bosworth, 
Burtless, and Steuerle (1999), and four more representing individuals who do not qualify for 
Social Security or die before receiving benefits.  A report of the work on MINT is provided in 
Toder et al. (2002).  Relatedly, Steuerle, Spiro, and Carasso (2000) report on on an earlier 
version of MINT that the average earnings of actual workers born between 1931 and 1935 are 
closer to the low wage hypothetical worker than to the average wage hypothetical worker.  Also, 
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Cohen, Steuerle, and Carasso (2001) use the MINT study to analyze the “money’s worth” from 
Social Security groups with different socioeconomic characteristics, extrapolating for late-career 
earnings and retirement ages for younger cohorts.  Similarly, Smith, Toder, and Iams (2001) 
study redistribution issues for Social Security, and with the MINT data they are able to account 
for spousal earnings as well when studying impacts on the income distribution. 
A final approach is microsimulation modeling, in which an artificial collection of 
individuals is simulated using the relationships estimated from a microdataset.  For instance, 
Harris, Sabelhaus, and Schwabish (2006) explain a way to project labor force participation and 
earnings for future workers in order to test the implications of different Social Security reforms.  
In a separate study, Caldwell et al. (1999) use a microsimulation model with an artificial 
population generated from the 1960 U.S. Census Public-Use Microdata Sample to study 
redistribution issues. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 The data for this study is the Social Security Administration’s Benefits and Earnings 
Public-Use Files from 2004.  The data includes a random sample of one percent of all recipients 
of Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) benefits in December 2004.  This 
amounts to having earnings histories for 406,993 people.  Data about the benefits includes the 
type of benefit, the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) that serves as the basis for determining 
one’s benefit, and the monthly benefit received, as well as other details about whether the 
recipient was eligible for more than one type of benefit.  Data about the beneficiaries includes 
their year of birth, sex, year of current entitlement, and also the Social Security covered earnings 
(up to the taxable maximum) of the worker who qualified for the benefit aggregated between 
1937 and 1950, and then for each year between 1951 and 2003.  For example, if an observation 
consists of a child qualified for a survivor’s benefit from a deceased parent, then the parent’s 
earnings record is included in the observation.  The data provide a large sample of entire lifetime 
earnings records for men and women without needing to rely on simulated earnings forecasts for 
missing years.  
 The Social Security Administration’s Benefits and Earnings Public-Use Files from 2004 
are used to extract the lifetime earnings histories of 113,513 beneficiaries who were born 
between 1933 and 1942, who did not have earnings before 1951, and who qualified for 
retirement benefits at least in part on their own earnings records.  This eliminates those receiving 
disability benefits or other benefits only as a dependent.  But it includes spouses who obtain a 
benefit partially from their own earnings record as well as their spouse’s earnings record.  Also, 
because disability benefits automatically transition into retirement benefits at the full retirement 
age, the sample includes some such people who qualified for retirement benefits through 
disability. 
 To consider a worker’s position in the income distribution, we will use a measure of 
lifetime income, as opposed to the frequent use of current income in studies created without 
access to lifetime earnings.  Specifically, we use the present discounted value of earnings from 
age 21 through the final year preceding Social Security benefit receipt.  We divide each year of 
earnings by the Average Wage Index value for that year, which defines the wage in terms of its 
ratio to the average wage.  This is done in order to normalize the role of productivity increases 
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that boost the wages for later cohorts.  For results shown in this paper, we use a discount rate of 3 
percent, though we have also checked our results for other discount rates and do not find major 
qualitative differences in the outcomes.  The discount rate can be thought of in real terms, since 
our wage normalization removes the impacts of general wage growth in the economy. 
 The main advantage of this data is that it provides lifetime earnings for the entire careers 
of already-retired workers without the need to estimate missing earnings for any part of the 
workers’ careers.  But there remain several limitations for the effectiveness of this data.  First, 
Social Security covered earnings are all that is included, which means that some people may 
show zero earnings in years when they switched to employment not covered by Social Security.  
The extent of this problem is hard to quantify, but it is unlikely that people switch frequently 
between covered and uncovered employment, and Fullerton and Mast (2005) include evidence 
that over 90 percent of the labor force has been covered by Social Security since the 1970s.  
However, earnings in the dataset are unfortunately topcoded at the maximum taxable level.  This 
is particularly troublesome in the 1950s and 1960s, when the lack of adjustments for inflation led 
the maximum taxable wage to be less than 40 percent larger than the average wage, as can be 
seen in Figure 1.  The closest point between maximum taxable and average earnings occurred in 
1965, when the AWI was $4659 and the maximum taxable earnings were $4800.  Since 1980, 
the maximum taxable earnings have been at least double the value of the AWI, and they stand at 
$90,000 in 2005.   
// Figure 1 About Here // 
Figure 1 also shows the percent of workers in the sample who earned the maximum 
taxable earnings for each year between 1951 and 2003.  In the 1960s, 25 to 30 percent of workers 
had incomes at least as large as the maximum table earnings, but the percentage has gradually 
fallen since then and is presently only a few percentage points.  This is an unfortunate situation 
for our analysis, but the biases created by this data limitation should be somewhat limited.  First, 
the censored earnings will likely not have much impact on the ordering of individuals in the 
lifetime income distribution.  This is because as we move up the income distribution, we find 
more cases of censored earnings, which will proxy for more earnings in the general ordering of 
individuals.  Next, the censored earnings will bias our analysis of individual accounts because 
earnings are more censored in the early part of careers, which leads to an appearance of an 
upward trend in lifetime earnings that is more pronounced than reality for those affected by 
income censoring.  To the extent that this occurs, it will reduce the portfolio value accumulated 
in the defined-contribution individual account because there will be less earnings in the early part 
of one’s career to benefit from compound interest.  Nevertheless, this problem will be limited for 
workers in the lower part of the income distribution who rarely tend to earn the taxable 
maximum, and it will mostly only affect workers in the top part of the income distribution.  
Table 2 provides more information about this situation by dividing the income distribution into 
ten deciles, and showing the breakdown of individuals based on the number of years of topcoded 
earnings for each decile of the distribution.  Half of the sample does not have any censored 
earning during their careers.  We do not otherwise attempt to impute missing earnings, for 
reasons related to the data limitation that will be described next.  
  // Table 2 About Here // 
7 
 Another limitation of the data is a lack of any socioeconomic characteristics beyond the 
year of birth and gender.  For instance, there is no data on education or race.  Obtaining this 
information would require a link between our data and a previously described survey such as the 
SIPP, HRS, or CPS.  This lack of information leaves out potential explanatory variables in any 
attempt to impute earnings beyond the maximum taxable level, and it prevents the classification 
of beneficiaries by such characteristics.  Otherwise, it does not create an impediment to studying 
the characteristics of the lifetime earnings of actual workers and how these characteristics may 
potentially affect the returns from defined-contribution individual accounts.  More importantly, 
though, marital status is not included in the data.  Marital status can be inferred for those people 
who receive spousal benefits, though such people could be divorced, but the marital status is 
completely unknown for anyone who is not earning some form of a spousal benefit.  This 
prevents an examination of lifetime earnings within a household.  It also means that some 
individuals we classify as low-income may actually be living in wealthy households as a result of 
high spousal earnings or other income-generating assets.  We must stress that this applies 
throughout the paper, as our analysis of the lower part of the income distribution may include 
some such individuals. 
 Another limitation of the data is related to cohort effects, as the lifetime earnings 
situation of those in our sample (born between 1933 and 1942) may not produce results that can 
be generalized to more recent cohorts.  In particular, Toder et al. (2002) finds in the MINT study 
that in recent years women have experienced increasing labor force participation, and in 
particular young women in their 20s no longer experience a dip in their employment rates.  This 
will tend to make current earnings differences between men and women less pronounced than in 
the past.  But with this study, we seek to examine lifetime earnings patterns without using 
assumptions to extrapolate the earnings of a partial career, and lifetime earnings for the younger 
cohorts are not yet available. 
 Furthermore, it must be clear that this dataset does not contain a random sample of the 
U.S. population.  The sample contains data only for those who actually receive Social Security 
benefits in December 2004.  For people of retirement age, the sample is biased to look richer 
because it excludes people who have already died before December 2004, as researchers have 
demonstrated an inverse relationship between income and mortality since Kitagawa and Hauser 
(1973), and people who did not earn enough to qualify for Social Security benefits on their own 
earnings records.  But the sample is biased to look poorer because it does not include those 
people who are still working and who have not begun to collect benefits.   
 A quick examination of data in the March 2005 Current Population Survey (CPS), a 
household survey by the Census Bureau representative of the United States population, can 
provide a few insights into this problem.  The March 2005 survey includes data about 2004 
income and work status.  Birth years are not included, but we can approximate the sample of 
those born between 1933 and 1942 by limiting our analysis to those between the ages of 62 and 
71 in March 2005 when the survey was conducted.  What we find is that 70.1 percent of these 
individuals are receiving Social Security benefits.  Furthermore, 37.8 percent of this sample is 
working, including 27.3 percent of those receiving Social Security benefits, and 62.3 percent of 
those not receiving benefits.  Most workers in the United States are now working in Social 
Security covered employment, but one possibility is that recent immigrants have not worked the 
necessary 10 years to qualify.  As a summary measure, 11.8 percent of the individuals in this age 
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range were not born in the United States.  For such individuals, only 53.4 percent were receiving 
Social Security benefits, compared to 72.2 percent of native born residents.  Finally, we find 
evidence that those not receiving Social Security benefits include a combination of relatively 
low-income and high-income individuals.  Table 3 shows that the family incomes of those not 
receiving benefits fall more heavily below the poverty line, as well as at least five times above 
the poverty line, than do the family incomes of Social Security recipients. 
  // Table 3 About Here // 
 Also relevant is that it would be a mistake to assume that the historical wage distribution 
in 1963, for example, would be the same as the wage distribution shown in the data.  The data 
sample of earnings from 1963 may be quite different, since being in the sample requires that you 
be a recipient of Social Security benefits in December 2004. 
RESULTS 
 The data will be analyzed according to various characteristics related to lifetime earnings 
patterns to assess the comparability between actual workers and their hypothetical counterparts.  
These characteristics include retirement ages, the number of years worked, and earnings patterns 
by age.  An important policy implication of the data will also be considered with respect to 
reforms that would create defined-contribution personal retirement accounts.  Distinctions will 
be made on the basis of age, gender, and position in the income distribution.   
Age of Initial Social Security Retirement Benefits Receipt 
 Hypothetical worker studies generally assume that workers retire at their full retirement 
age (FRA) or at age 62.  For workers born before 1938, the FRA is 65.  It is now in the process 
of increasing, and for those born since 1960, it is 67.  With the sample including those born 
between 1933 and 1942, the FRA ranges from 65 to 65 and 10 months.  Workers can collect 
retirement benefits using their own earnings record starting at age 62, though these benefits are 
reduced to account for the amount of time before the FRA.  Additionally, delays up to age 70 can 
lead to an increase in annual benefits to compensate for the benefits sacrificed by the delay.  
There is no financial incentive to delay benefit receipt beyond age 70 though.  While the 
retirement age assumption does not matter to the extent that these benefit reductions and 
additions are calculated to be actuarially fair, it does matter because delaying one’s retirement 
probably occurs as a result of continuing employment, which can raise lifetime income and 
provide more time for growth in a defined-contribution account.  As such, it is instructive to 
examine some characteristics of the age in which workers begin to collect Social Security 
retirement benefits. 
 From the data, we can find the distribution of the age of initial benefit receipt for Social 
Security retirement benefits.  This does not necessarily imply that one has retired, because people 
can continue working after collecting retirement benefits.  The decision about whether to collect 
benefits while still working is complicated by several factors, including benefit offsets in years 
prior to the FRA, delayed retirement credits for waiting up to age 70, and income tax issues 
related to Social Security benefits.  This being said, precisely half of the workers in the sample 
began collecting reduced retirement benefits at the earliest possible age of 62.  Another 14 
9 
percent began at age 63, 5 percent at age 64, and 28 percent at age 65, which reflects the FRA for 
everyone in the sample.  Only 3 percent of these workers delayed their retirements beyond age 
65.  One must keep in mind with this result, though, that people who were not yet collecting their 
benefits in December 2004 are not included in the sample, so that the age distribution just 
described is biased in the downward direction.  To give some idea about this, the Committee on 
Ways and Means (2004) provides the distribution of new beneficiary ages for different calendar 
years and finds, for instance, that 4 percent of new beneficiaries in 1985 were aged 66 and older, 
and this amount rose to 17.8 percent in 2001. 
  // Figure 2 About Here // 
 Figure 2 examines the relationship between one’s position in the lifetime income 
distribution and the age in which retirement benefits begin.  Note that the boxes in Figure 2 and 
others show the median and interquartile range, and the whiskers are extended to the distance of 
1.5 times the length of the interquartile range.  The “+” signs beyond the whiskers represent any 
remaining outliers.  The figure displays a weak trend that wealthier individuals retire at later 
ages, though the median retirement age for each income decile is below age 64, except for the 
top decile.  If lower earners tend to retire at younger ages, then the implication for potential 
personal retirement accounts would be underperformance because of fewer years for assets to 
accumulate interest.   
Number of Years Worked 
 Hypothetical worker studies typically assume that workers have careers spanning at least 
40 years.  Workers are assumed to begin their careers at age 21 or 22 and continue until either 
age 62 (the earliest age to receive reduced retirement benefits) or age 65 (the historical full 
retirement age).  Meanwhile, the Social Security benefit computation formula uses the top 35 
years of earnings in covered employment since age 21 to calculate the worker’s AIME.  Working 
less than 35 years will result in lower benefits than would be implied by such hypothetical 
worker studies.  Fewer years of work would also mean less contributions to any individual 
account than would be assumed by the hypothetical worker study. 
  // Figure 3 About Here // 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of years worked between age 21 and the age that 
retirement benefits began for all of the workers in the sample, also separated by gender.  While 
workers must contribute for at least 10 years to receive retirement benefits, some workers 
become disabled after fewer years of work and can roll their disability benefits over into 
retirement benefits at their FRA.  Thus, the distribution ranges from less than 10 years of work 
up to more than 45 years of work.  Importantly, for the combined genders, less than 50 percent of 
retirees have worked at least 35 years, about 40 percent have worked for less than 30 years, and 
about 25 percent have worked for less than 25 years.  Separated by gender, about 30 percent of 
men work less than 35 years, but almost 75 percent of women work less than 35 years.   
  // Figure 4 About Here // 
Figure 4 further shows the reasonable result that there is a positive correlation between 
lifetime income and the number of years worked.    Few workers in the bottom half of the 
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lifetime income distribution have worked at least 35 years.  It is mostly in the upper deciles of 
the income distribution where we can find many people with long careers of at least 40 years.  
An implication for policy is that when reforms include minimum benefit guarantees for those 
with long careers, there will be few people who would meet the criteria for the guarantee.  Again, 
however, we must include the possibility that some people who worked for shorter periods or 
who have low lifetime earnings may have spouses who acted as a primary earner, as was often 
the case for married women from these birth cohorts.   
Patterns of Earnings by Age 
 To begin, Figure 5 shows the lifetime earnings patterns for 25 randomly selected males, 
in which earnings at each age are reflected as the ratio of the worker’s earnings to the AWI of the 
corresponding year.  Figure 6 repeats this exercise for females.  In these figures, the hypothetical 
average worker’s earnings are reflected by the horizontal line at height one.  This pattern does 
not apply to any actual workers, and indeed the figures show a great deal of diversity in worker 
earnings patterns.  While the most common pattern shows a steady increase in relative earnings 
over time, a number of the cases show relative decreases over time and short careers.  As for 
women, there are fewer cases of women earning the AWI level, and many women show 
temporary and sporadic attachments to the formal labor force. 
  // Figure 5 About Here // 
  // Figure 6 About Here // 
 Figures 7 and 8 quantify these matters more carefully by showing the distribution of 
earnings by age group.  These figures demonstrate that the AWI overstates earnings by the most 
at early and older ages.  In Figure 7, men and women are combined, and the inverse-U shape of 
earnings as one ages is clear.  Earnings as a percentage of the AWI peak in a worker’s 40s.  
Nonetheless, the median earnings at any age group never reaches the level of the AWI, even 
when removing those who did not work in a particular five-year span, as is done in the bottom 
half of the figure.  Figure 8 separates men and women, showing the age-earnings profile for each 
gender.  For men, median earnings do exceed the AWI in the 30s, 40s, and early 50s, though 
they are less in the 20s and after age 55.  Women, on the other hand, show strikingly lower 
wages.  Women’s peak earnings come in their late 40s and early 50s, but even at these ages, 
more than 75 percent of the women who qualified for Social Security benefits on their own 
earnings records still did not earn at least the AWI. 
  // Figure 7 About Here // 
 The lower wages of women lead them to cluster in the lower lifetime income deciles.  
More than 80 percent of those in the lowest income deciles are women, while less than ten 
percent of the top income decile is women.  Though many of these women may also be 
contributing to their household with nonsalaried work and may also be eligible for Social 
Security benefits from a spouse’s earnings record, these results show the unrealistic nature of 
hypothetical worker studies that assume the same earnings levels for men and women.  Because 
lower wage earners obtain higher returns from the Social Security contributions through the 
progressive benefit formula used by the Social Security Administration, this implies that women 
11 
not receiving a spousal benefit will be relatively worse off from any potential switch to 
individual accounts that do not include a redistribution component. 
  // Figure 8 About Here // 
Asset Accumulations in Defined-Contribution Individual Accounts 
 We have observed a number of differences between hypothetical workers and actual 
workers, and now we investigate the implications for defined-contribution pensions, which are 
becoming an increasingly popular path for reform in countries dealing with aging populations.  
In the United States, the President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security (2001) presented 
three proposals that would include personal retirement accounts (PRAs) as a part of Social 
Security reform, and for about one year after President Bush’s re-election in 2004, America 
engaged in a serious debate about their potential merits.  Likewise, Whitehouse (2007) cites the 
growth of mandatory defined-contribution pensions in countries ranging from Latin America and 
the Caribbean to Eastern Europe and Central Asia.  This research can lend further insight to the 
issue, as we determine that the returns which could be expected for actual workers will tend to 
fall below their hypothetical counterparts on account of differences in both the shape and level of 
lifetime earnings.  Here we quantify the differences and look for a hypothetical worker with 
characteristics that will better match the case of actual workers. 
 Matters here will be kept simple as we assume workers invest a fraction of their Social 
Security covered earnings into an individual account at the end of each year they work, and their 
assets will accumulate and grow with a constant annual nominal return of 8 percent.  This rate of 
return is consistent with what is used by financial advisors to simulate savings growth, and it can 
be thought to imply a 3 percent inflation rate and a 5 percent real return.  The choice of return is 
not particularly important, as we are mostly interested in differences between actual and 
hypothetical workers sharing similar assumptions for their defined-contribution accounts, except 
that higher returns will create a bigger advantage for those with earnings early in their careers, 
which will therefore tend to produce even better results for hypothetical workers relative to 
actual workers.   
// Table 4 About Here // 
 Table 4 provides the information relevant to this discussion.  It shows the ratio of the 
total portfolios accumulated by actual workers to the portfolios accumulated by corresponding 
hypothetical workers.  Results are shown across the income distribution, and the median ratio as 
well as the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles and standard deviations are shown for the comparisons of 
actual workers to six types of hypothetical workers.  The average wage steady-earnings 
hypothetical worker counterpart is born in the same year as the worker and earns the Average 
Wage Index for 44 years from age 21 through age 64.  The average wage scaled-earnings worker 
has the same AIME as the steady-earnings worker, but the lifetime earnings are rescaled to show 
the inverted-U shape lifetime earnings pattern provided in Clingman and Nichols (2007).  These 
two categories will particularly emphasize the importance of the level of earnings and how these 
levels compare between hypothetical and actual workers.  Third and fourth, income-equivalent 
hypothetical workers are otherwise the same as above, but have their AIMEs calibrated to match 
the AIME of each actual worker.  By adjusting the level of earnings to be the same, these 
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workers will indicate the role of earnings patterns in determining one’s portfolio accumulations.  
Finally, the fifth and sixth hypothetical workers are also income-equivalent workers, but they 
retire at age 62 rather than age 65. 
 For the table values, any number larger than one implies that the actual worker could 
obtain a higher benefit than their hypothetical counterpart, while values less than one imply that 
the hypothetical worker will do better.  We express the results as ratios, because the actual levels 
of portfolio assets and benefits will depend on many factors, such as how much is saved, the 
actual returns to the accounts that can be achieved, whether annuitization is mandatory, the 
administrative and overhead costs from annuitization, the type of annuity is chosen, the 
assumptions about asset returns and mortality for the annuity, and the transition costs that would 
be required to pay for promised benefits from the current Social Security system.  It is the 
relative differences in outcomes for defined-contribution pensions between hypothetical workers 
and actual workers that interest us, and aside from emphasizing this important detail, the paper 
does not otherwise attempt to determine whether or not such reforms should be undertaken.  We 
are interested to know what characteristics of actual workers lead them to do better relative to 
hypothetical workers, as well as what kind of hypothetical worker will be most comparable to 
actual workers. 
 First, Table 4 compares actual workers to the average wage steady-earnings hypothetical 
worker retiring at age 65.  It is not until the 9
th
 income decile that we find the median actual 
worker who can accumulate as much.  In fact, workers in the bottom half of the income 
distribution can expect to retire with less than half the assets of the average wage hypothetical 
worker.  For average wage scaled-earnings hypothetical workers who have less earnings in the 
early part of their careers, we find a closer connection to actual workers.  Nonetheless, it is still 
not until the 8
th
 income decile in which we find the median ratio to be larger than one.  Both of 
these results suggest that the lifetime incomes of actual workers fall below hypothetical workers, 
and based on earnings levels, hypothetical workers will tend to overestimate the portfolio 
accumulations of actual workers. 
 Next, the income-equivalent steady and scaled earnings workers allow us to examine the 
role of earnings patterns more directly after removing the impacts of earnings levels.  With 
lifetime incomes adjusted to match each actual worker, the income-equivalent hypothetical 
workers will accumulate larger portfolios only when they have more earnings in the early parts 
of their careers compared to actual workers.  Here we find clear evidence that standard 
hypothetical workers will dramatically overestimate the accumulations in individual accounts for 
reasons related to the pattern of earnings, and that these problems are even more severe in the 
bottom part of the income distribution.  For the income-equivalent steady earnings worker, the 
median ratio in the bottom decile of the income distribution is only 0.655.  This means that the 
low income workers have a larger part of their earnings late in their career so that they can only 
accumulate 65.5 percent as much as a hypothetical worker with the same overall earnings but a 
steady earnings pattern.  The situation is improved when compared to the income-equivalent 
scaled-earnings hypothetical worker, but still low income workers can only expect 73.4 percent 
as much in the median case.  As we move across the income distribution, workers do better, even 
despite the topcoding problem we previously described that will cause a downward bias in the 
ratios for high income workers.  By the top income decile, we find that the median workers could 
accumulate 72.7 percent and 81.5 percent as much as the respective steady and scaled-earnings 
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hypothetical worker.   
Another important matter is that the standard deviations for the ratios decrease as we 
move up the income distribution, which suggests more volatility in the earnings patterns of low 
income workers.  The 5
th
 percentile ratio for low income workers is much lower than for high 
income workers, and even the 95
th 
percentile is a little less.  These results suggest a consistent 
effect in that low income workers do tend to obtain more of their earnings late in their careers, 
which puts them at a disadvantage in accumulating assets for their defined-contribution account.  
Studies using hypothetical workers will potentially make defined-contribution accounts look 
more favorable than may otherwise be possible. 
 Finally, Table 4 shows corresponding results when the hypothetical workers are assumed 
to retire at the early retirement age of 62.  Actually, this assumption can move a long way toward 
alleviating the problems described before, particularly for the scaled-earnings worker.  Though it 
is still the case that low wage workers will fare less well than high wage workers, the median 
ratios for the bottom decile is now 0.953, and by the fourth decile the median rises above one.  
This suggests, as a policy recommendation, that studies of defined-contribution pensions that use 
hypothetical workers should rely on scaled-earnings that can easily be obtained from a household 
survey that includes questions about age and wages in a given year, and should assume the 
earliest possible retirement age for the hypothetical worker.  
CONCLUSIONS 
 This research has compared the lifetime earnings histories of actual workers to the 
hypothetical workers used in a variety of studies about Social Security.  We find that actual 
workers show much variability in their earnings and may spend many years out of the labor 
force.  Earnings also show an inverse-U pattern over the careers of actual workers, not the steady 
wage pattern commonly assumed by hypothetical worker studies.  Also, women earn much less 
than men throughout their careers, and the average wage hypothetical worker does not represent 
women well.  As a result, hypothetical workers will tend to accumulate much more in defined-
contribution pension systems than can be expected for actual workers with realistic lifetime 
earnings.  Also, workers in the bottom part of the lifetime income distribution will experience 
worse outcomes not only because of a lower level of earnings, but also because the pattern of 
earnings for low income workers is such that a higher proportion of wages come late in the 
career.  Scholars are already pursuing alternative data sources, and indeed future research should 
progress toward producing better tools for Social Security analysis.  Nonetheless, many countries 
do not have lifetime earnings data available, and the results of this study suggest that in choosing 
hypothetical workers it would be wise to assume a scaled-earnings pattern and to assume that 
workers will retire at the earliest possible age. 
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TABLE 1 
Datasets With Earnings Used in United States Social Security Studies 
Name of Dataset Details About Data 
Links to Social Security  
Earnings Records (SSER) 
SSA Benefits and Earnings 
Public-Use File 
Provides Annual Social Security Covered Earnings 
Data since 1951 
This is the SSER data 
Survey of Income and 
Program Participation 
(SIPP) 
U.S. Census Bureau survey is meant to provide 
information to the government about the effectiveness 
of its social programs.  Survey has continued since 
1984 with a series of panels lasting 2.5 to 4 years each 
Yes, can be linked 
Health and Retirement 
Survey (HRS) 
University of Michigan survey of about 22,000 
individuals aged 50 and over in 1998.  Survey is 
longitudinal and is conducted every two years since 
1992 
Yes, can be linked 
Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) 
Panel data for 8,000 families since 1968.  After the 
2003 updates, the survey included information for up to 
36 years in the lives of 65,000 individuals. 
No direct link, but 
statistical matching 
techniques have been used 
Current Population Survey 
(CPS) 
U.S. Government survey includes earnings data with its 
annual March survey.  It provides cross-section data for 
United States workers, but no panel data links are 
available between years. 
Yes, can be linked 
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TABLE 2 
The Distribution of Top-coded Earnings By Income Level 
Decile of the Income 
Distribution 
Number of Years of Topcoded Earnings   
0 1 - 5 6 - 10 11 - 20 21 +   Row Totals 
        
1 9.93% 0.07% 0% 0% 0%  10% 
2 9.48% 0.52% 0% 0% 0%  10% 
3 8.78% 1.18% 0.04% 0% 0%  10% 
4 7.91% 1.84% 0.24% 0.01% 0%  10% 
5 6.51% 2.64% 0.69% 0.16% 0%  10% 
6 4.55% 3.25% 1.41% 0.77% 0.01%  10% 
7 2.15% 3.47% 2.06% 2.10% 0.23%  10% 
8 0.53% 2.16% 2.41% 3.75% 1.15%  10% 
9 0.04% 0.63% 1.44% 4.37% 3.51%  10% 
10 0% 0.04% 0.26% 1.97% 7.73%  10% 
        
Column Totals 49.88% 15.80% 8.55% 13.13% 12.63%   
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3 
Distribution of Current Income for those Aged 62 to 71, 
Based on Social Security Beneficiary Status 
  
Not Receiving Social 
Security 
Social Security 
Recipients 
Below Poverty Line 13.6% 7.7% 
100% - 199% of Poverty Line 11.9% 22.3% 
200% - 299% of Poverty Line 13.3% 20.4% 
300% - 399% of Poverty Line 12.2% 14.5% 
400% - 499% of Poverty Line 10.5% 10.2% 
Above 500% of Poverty Line 38.5% 24.9% 
Source: Author's Calcuations from March 2005 Current Population Survey 
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TABLE 4 
Ratio of Worker's Total Portfolio at Retirement  
to Hypothetical Worker Counterpart's Portfolio 
           
 Decile of the Income Distribution (AIME) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  Average Wage Steady-Earnings Hypothetical Worker (21 - 64) 
5th Pctile 0.040 0.129 0.210 0.301 0.412 0.543 0.689 0.843 0.996 1.162 
Median 0.097 0.185 0.280 0.390 0.520 0.666 0.821 0.979 1.133 1.366 
95th Pctile 0.161 0.263 0.384 0.523 0.681 0.855 1.041 1.233 1.427 1.737 
Std. Dev. 0.038 0.042 0.055 0.070 0.086 0.098 0.112 0.126 0.142 0.188 
 Average Wage Scaled-Earnings Hypothetical Worker (21 - 64) 
5th Pctile 0.046 0.145 0.235 0.339 0.462 0.609 0.773 0.947 1.118 1.303 
Median 0.109 0.208 0.314 0.438 0.583 0.748 0.921 1.099 1.271 1.528 
95th Pctile 0.181 0.296 0.432 0.589 0.767 0.962 1.172 1.387 1.607 1.951 
Std. Dev. 0.042 0.047 0.062 0.079 0.097 0.111 0.127 0.142 0.161 0.213 
  Income Equivalent Steady-Earnings Hypothetical Worker (21 - 64) 
5th Pctile 0.400 0.484 0.520 0.544 0.559 0.578 0.595 0.608 0.620 0.640 
Median 0.655 0.682 0.679 0.687 0.703 0.724 0.731 0.730 0.721 0.727 
95th Pctile 0.955 0.967 0.944 0.925 0.936 0.944 0.943 0.950 0.935 0.911 
Std. Dev. 0.172 0.150 0.134 0.121 0.116 0.113 0.107 0.105 0.097 0.086 
 Income Equivalent Scaled-Earnings Hypothetical Worker (21 - 64) 
5th Pctile 0.450 0.545 0.585 0.612 0.628 0.649 0.668 0.683 0.697 0.716 
Median 0.734 0.765 0.762 0.771 0.790 0.813 0.820 0.819 0.809 0.815 
95th Pctile 1.075 1.087 1.060 1.040 1.051 1.061 1.060 1.067 1.052 1.023 
Std. Dev. 0.193 0.169 0.151 0.137 0.130 0.127 0.120 0.119 0.109 0.098 
  Income Equivalent Steady-Earnings Hypothetical Worker (21 - 61) 
5th Pctile 0.524 0.634 0.681 0.712 0.732 0.757 0.778 0.795 0.812 0.836 
Median 0.857 0.893 0.889 0.899 0.921 0.948 0.956 0.955 0.944 0.952 
95th Pctile 1.250 1.265 1.236 1.211 1.225 1.236 1.234 1.243 1.225 1.193 
Std. Dev. 0.225 0.197 0.175 0.159 0.152 0.148 0.140 0.138 0.127 0.113 
 Income Equivalent Scaled-Earnings Hypothetical Worker (21 - 61) 
5th Pctile 0.585 0.709 0.760 0.795 0.816 0.843 0.868 0.888 0.906 0.930 
Median 0.953 0.994 0.990 1.001 1.026 1.056 1.065 1.064 1.051 1.059 
95th Pctile 1.396 1.414 1.378 1.351 1.366 1.379 1.377 1.387 1.367 1.330 
Std. Dev. 0.250 0.220 0.196 0.178 0.169 0.165 0.157 0.154 0.142 0.127 
Note: The average wage steady-earnings hypothetical worker counterpart is born in the same year as the 
worker and earns the Average Wage Index for each age of employment (indicated in parenthesis).  The 
scaled-earnings worker is the same as the steady-earnings worker, except that lifetime earnings are 
rescaled to show the inverted-U shape earnings pattern provided in Clingman and Nichols (2007).  
Income-Equivalent counterpart workers have their incomes adjusted up or down so that they have the 
same AIME as each worker in the sample. 
Source: Author's calculations Using the 2004 SSER 
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Note: The boxes show the median and interquartile range, and the whiskers are extended to the distance of 1.5 times 
the length of the interquartile range.  The “+” signs beyond the whiskers represent any remaining outliers.   
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Figure 4 
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Note: The boxes show the median and interquartile range, and the whiskers are extended to the distance of 1.5 times 
the length of the interquartile range.  The “+” signs beyond the whiskers represent any remaining outliers.   
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